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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Simple instrument rules like a Taylor rule that link the policy rate to inflation and measures of 
economic activity are widely used concepts in monetary macroeconomics. Even though the 
idea is simple, Taylor rules have been used in various areas for both positive and normative 
analyses. On the one hand, as Taylor himself originally pointed out, such a rule is able to 
explain U.S. monetary policy extraordinarily well. This finding has frequently been captured 
and confirmed. On the other hand, Taylor rules can be used in order to ex-post evaluate 
monetary policy and assess the quality of the monetary policy stance by comparing actual 
developments in the policy rate with the interest rate implied by the Taylor rule. In other words, 
policy is said to be too loose when the monetary policy instrument was below the Taylor rule-
implied interest rate, whereas it is said to be too tight if it was above the implied rate. 
 
There is evidence that Taylor rules also have some value in evaluating the quality of monetary 
policy, or, put differently, it provides information about what a “good” action for a monetary 
authority might be. In this respect, public statements from policy makers strongly suggest that 
central banks around the globe indeed let the information resulting from simple instrument 
rules influence their policy choice or, at least, use resulting information as cross-checks for their 
decisions. 
 
We examine whether cross-checking policy rate decisions with information from simple 
instrument rules under model uncertainty documented in previous research carries over to the 
case of parameter uncertainty. In other words, we consider a form of uncertainty where the 
monetary authority is to a certain degree confident about the true economic environment. We 
find that adjusting monetary policy based on this kind of cross-checking can be beneficial for 
the monetary authority. This, however, crucially depends on the importance that the monetary 
authority attaches to stabilizing output volatility relative to stabilizing inflation volatility as 
well as the degree of monetary policy commitment. The monetary authority is on average able 
to benefit from policy rate cross-checking when it only moderately cares about stabilizing 
output and when policy is set in a discretionary way. Optimal policy and Taylor rule cross-checking
under parameter uncertainty∗
Dirk Bursian†
Goethe University Frankfurt
Markus Roth‡
Goethe University Frankfurt
September 26, 2013
Abstract
We examine whether the robustifying nature of Taylor rule cross-
checking under model uncertainty carries over to the case of parameter
uncertainty. Adjusting monetary policy based on this kind of cross-
checking can improve the outcome for the monetary authority. This,
however, crucially depends on the relative welfare weight that is at-
tached to the output gap and also the degree of monetary policy com-
mitment. We ﬁnd that Taylor rule cross-checking is on average able
to improve losses when the monetary authority only moderately cares
about output stabilization and when policy is set in a discretionary
way.
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The Taylor rule is a widely used concept in monetary macroeconomics. Even
though the idea is simple, it has been used in various areas. Taylor (1993)
employs a positive analysis in the sense that he points out that the rule
explains U.S. monetary policy extraordinarily well. Subsequently, this ﬁnding
has been frequently captured and conﬁrmed. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000)
apply the concept to pre-European Monetary Union data and estimate a
policy rule for euro area countries. They show that monetary policy can also
be described well by a Taylor rule and obtain similar coeﬃcient estimates
as the ones initially assumed by Taylor (1993). Other studies suggest that
using real time data and projections for estimating the policy rule parameters
might even improve the explanatory power of the Taylor rule (Orphanides
and Wieland, 2008).
On the other hand, Taylor rules can be used in order to ex-post evaluate
monetary policy and therefore to employ a normative analysis. The quality
of monetary policy can be assessed by comparing actual developments in the
short term interest rate with the interest rate implied by a Taylor rule, in
other words policy was too loose when the monetary policy instrument was
below the Taylor rule-implied interest rate, whereas it was too tight if it was
above the implied rate. Poole (2007) deﬁnes monetary policy following the
Taylor rule as being “systematic”, hence he is able to ﬁnd periods where U.S.
monetary policy is not systematic according to his deﬁnition.
Selected statements from either policy makers or academics furthermore
suggest that interest rates based on the Taylor rule provide information
whether or not the current monetary policy stance is adequate. Governor
Janet Yellen indicated the Taylor rule as a means of providing her “a rough
sense of whether or not the funds rate is at a reasonable level”. “I do not dis-
agree with the Greenbook strategy. But the Taylor rule and other rules ... call
for a rate in the 5 percent range, which is where we already are. Therefore, I
am not imagining another 150 basis points.” (FOMC transcripts, January 31
to February 1, 1995). Among others, Taylor and Williams (2010) argue that
“simple monetary policy rules are designed to take account of only the most
1basic principle of monetary policy of leaning against the wind of inﬂation and
output movements. Because they are not ﬁne tuned to speciﬁc assumptions,
they are more robust to mistaken assumptions.”
We investigate the usefulness of the Taylor rule for monetary policy as a
“guideline” in the sense that it provides valuable information for the monetary
authority about the adequateness of its monetary policy. More precisely, we
examine the usefulness of “Taylor rule cross-checking”, namely whether devi-
ations of the Taylor rule-implied interest rate from the interest rate resulting
from an optimization problem of the monetary authority should inﬂuence pol-
icy rate decisions. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we consider
the case where the monetary authority is only faced with uncertainty on the
side of the parameters of the data generating process1 due to, for instance,
insuﬃcient estimation techniques, rather than the entire transmission mech-
anism itself as analyzed in Ilbas et al. (2012). Hence, we consider certainty
with respect to the structure of the economy but parameters are assumed
to be unknown and remain constant over time which clearly inﬂuences the
eﬀectiveness of policy actions. Second, we investigate to what extent the
eﬀectiveness of cross-checking is inﬂuenced by the monetary authority’s type
reﬂected by the relative weight it attaches to output stabilization and also
the degree of monetary policy commitment. In order to address the latter
question, we also consider monetary policy under discretion which has not
been examined in this context before. We perform multiple simulations of
a Smets and Wouters (2003) economy using an augmented monetary au-
thority’s objective function and diﬀerent realizations of the random shock
processes. Hence, our simulations provide us with a whole distribution of the
monetary authority’s objective.
We ﬁnd that Taylor-rule cross-checking can on average improve the mon-
etary authority’s losses when it only moderately cares about stabilizing out-
put relative to stabilizing inﬂation and when policy is set in a discretionary
way. In other words, policy makers which are less concerned about economic
activity and those who cannot credibly commit to an announced policy in
1See, for instance, Tillmann (2011), Giannoni (2007), or Söderström (2002) for other
approaches on parameter uncertainty.
2general beneﬁt more from Taylor rule cross-checking. Attention should be
paid to choosing the appropriate relative weight λ∆ which is attached to the
information resulting from Taylor rule cross-checking.
The paper is broadly related to the literature that examines the useful-
ness of the Taylor rule for the conduct of monetary policy. As the Taylor
rule seems to provide information about what a “good” action for a mon-
etary authority might be, empirical studies examine the responsiveness of
the interest rate to developments in the inﬂation rate. Judd and Rude-
busch (1998) look at monetary policy of diﬀerent Federal Reserve chairmen
in terms of estimated policy reaction functions. The Burns chairmanship,
for example, is identiﬁed as being less responsive to inﬂation which is put
forward as a reason for high realized inﬂation during the same time period.
Furthermore, Tillmann (2012) illustrates the usefulness of simple instrument
rules by showing that cross-checking optimal monetary policy under discre-
tion with information from the Taylor rule reduces the stabilization bias in
a small scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Ilbas
et al. (2012) show in a diﬀerent setting that the Taylor rule can robustify
monetary policy in case of model uncertainty, in other words in the case of
a complete mismatch between the model that the monetary authority uses
in order to determine its monetary policy and the true model and therefore
the data generating process of the economy. They ﬁnd that in such a frame-
work, even putting a small weight on the information resulting from Taylor
rule cross-checking in the process of the determination of optimal monetary
policy is able to insure against bad outcomes.2 In an empirical exercise, they
argue that actual monetary policy may be described by optimal monetary
policy which incorporates cross-checking of this kind. Other approaches on
cross-checking are discussed, for instance, in Beck and Wieland (2008) and
Christiano and Rostagno (2001). Their approaches can be seen as alterna-
tives to the robust policy proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2008) which
is discussed for DSGE models in Giordani and Söderlind (2004) where the
monetary authority also has a reference model at hand and considers the
2See, for instance, Levin et al. (2003), Levin and Williams (2003), or Levin et al. (1999)
for other approaches on optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty.
3possibility of a bad shock hitting the model economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 comments
on the theoretical framework including the conduct of monetary policy and
the model economy while section 3 presents simulation setup and simulation
results. The conclusion follows.
2 The theoretical framework
2.1 The conduct of monetary policy
In most cases, a Taylor-type rule is speciﬁed in order to close a DSGE model
where the nominal interest rate is a function of inﬂation and some measure
of economic activity. However, in our case, this step is obsolete. Our aim is
to replace an ad hoc and exogenously speciﬁed policy rule by a policy rule
that is obtained from the optimization problem of the monetary authority.
We assume that the monetary policy objective can be summarized by a
simple quadratic loss function. That is to say that the monetary authority
minimizes the weighted sum of the variances of certain target variables. This
approach is standard and for example presented in Clarida et al. (1999).
However, note that this loss function is not derived from welfare-theoretical
considerations. On the contrary, it is an ad hoc objective function trying to
describe preferences of the monetary authority. One could also think of this
loss function as a way to model ﬂexible inﬂation targeting as introduced by
Svensson (1999) where the monetary authority seeks to stabilize inﬂation,
output, and potentially other target variables simultaneously. We deﬁne the
“traditional” per period loss function as
Lt ≡ ˆ π
2
t + λyˆ y
2
t, (1)
where the parameter λy captures the relative importance of stabilizing
output, ˆ yt, to stabilizing inﬂation, ˆ πt. Variables with circumﬂex denote log-
deviations from the steady-state.
Motivated by the statements about the usefulness of the Taylor rule
4quoted in the introduction, we argue that equation (1) does not capture
the actual objective of the monetary authority. More precisely, the “tradi-
tional” per period loss function does not incorporate deviations of the interest
rate implied by optimal monetary policy from the interest rate implied by a
Taylor-type rule. Hence, in the standard approach, such interest rate devia-
tions are considered irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. However,
previous research suggests that the monetary authority might be better oﬀ
following a Taylor-type rule. In the case of uncertainty, the monetary au-
thority may want to insure itself against model misspeciﬁcation, meaning
that it seeks to robustify its policy. Ilbas et al. (2012) show that the Taylor
rule can indeed robustify monetary policy in case of model uncertainty, in
other words in the case of a complete mismatch between the model that the
monetary authority uses in order to determine its monetary policy and the
true data generating process of the economy.
We assume that there are two types of models. The ﬁrst model is referred
to as the reference model of the monetary authority which reﬂects its belief of
how the economy is structured and what the model parameters are. In prin-
cipal, the reference model may or may not entirely reﬂect the data generating
process of the economy. This gives rise to the second type of model, which
we call the true model or the data generating process. This model describes
the true structure of the economy and may diﬀer from the reference model.
In fact, we assume that both the reference model and the true model are
structurally identical and therefore reﬂect the same monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism. However, there is a misspeciﬁcation on the side of the
model parameters as the monetary authority is not able to perfectly estimate
all of them. This approach is realistic in the sense that we do not believe
the monetary authority (at least in the long run) to get it wrong in terms
of the reference model which is the basic implication of Ilbas et al. (2012).
Hence, the true model lies in the neighborhood of the monetary authority’s
reference model and we let the monetary authority optimize using the correct
structural model.
The monetary authority uses the reference model and knows about its
biased view of the world. It is therefore crucial to note that the policy based
5on the reference model is “optimal” just precisely in this model. In case of
parameter misspeciﬁcation the policy may very well turn out to be subopti-
mal and it is diﬃcult to judge ex ante, what the quantitative consequences of
a mismatch between the monetary authority’s reference model and the data
generating process in terms of loss will be. Hence, it might be beneﬁcial to
ﬁnd some way to insure against those misspeciﬁcation as the exact type of
the misspeciﬁcation is assumed to be unknown.
In what follows, we do not argue that the monetary authority should
completely and mechanically follow the Taylor rule in setting the interest
rate. Still, the monetary authority should be able to adjust its monetary
policy according to the signals it receives from performing Taylor rule cross-
checking. Therefore, we redeﬁne its objective by an augmented loss function
˜ Lt. Consider that the monetary authority also reacts to deviations of the
policy instrument from the Taylor rule-implied interest rate. We deﬁne this
spread as
∆t ≡ ˆ it −ˆ i
TR
t , (2)
where ˆ iTR
t denotes the interest rate implied by the Taylor rule. The speciﬁc
form we use is standard and reads
ˆ i
TR
t ≡ φπˆ πt + φyˆ yt. (3)
Inspired by Ilbas et al. (2012), we augment the standard loss function (1)
by a cross-checking term representing the squared interest rate spread and a
corresponding weighting parameter λ∆. Hence,
˜ Lt ≡ ˆ π
2
t + λyˆ y
2
t + λ∆∆
2
t. (4)
Equation (4) belongs to the class of “modiﬁed” loss functions, with the most
well-known examples presented in Rogoﬀ (1985) and Walsh (1995).
It is worthwhile to point out that we do not focus on maximizing welfare
with respect to the choice of the Taylor-rule parameters in (3). In contrast,
our concern is the monetary authority’s choice of λ∆ and its impact on wel-
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Figure 1: Losses and squared deviations between the federal funds rate and
the Taylor rule-implied interest rate for the U.S. .
fare. Hence, we calibrate the Taylor-rule parameters as originally done in
Taylor (1993), in other words φπ = 1.5 and φy = 0.5. In order to empirically
motivate this approach, consider ﬁgure 1 where we plot the squared value of
∆t against the loss resulting from the period loss function (1). We compute
those series from actual quarterly U.S. data. For the sake of simplicity, the
output gap refers to a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter de-trended time series. A stan-
dard smoothing parameter of 1,600 was applied. A constant inﬂation target
of zero was assumed.3 The ﬁgure suggests that there is a relationship be-
tween the monetary authority’s loss and deviations of the federal funds rate
from the Taylor rule-implied interest rate. Both series are positively corre-
lated. Therefore, it seems that the monetary authority experiences higher
losses when deviations of the policy instrument from the Taylor rule-implied
interest rate are large and vice versa.
Since the monetary authority faces a dynamic problem, it minimizes a
discounted “lifetime” loss function
L0 = E0
∞ X
t=0
(1 − β)β
t˜ Lt, (5)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor subject to the equations characterizing
the reference model. The standard approach of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is
nested by setting λ∆ = 0 in (4). Under commitment the monetary authority
3Assuming a moderate inﬂation target of 1 percent and excluding the recent ﬁnancial
crisis starting August 2007 (see, for instance, Trichet, 2010) do not aﬀect the results.
7is able to credibly convince the public that it will stick to a particular policy,
and thus, it can inﬂuence the agents’ expectations. This enables the mon-
etary authority, compared to a discretionary policy maker, to obtain lower
future losses at the cost of higher losses today. The commitment case is use-
ful in order to isolate the eﬀects of Taylor rule cross-checking from that of
lack of credibility and makes results comparable to Ilbas et al. (2012) where
a commitment technology is available to the monetary authority. We ad-
ditionally consider the discretionary case and employ numerical approaches
in order to calculate both optimal policies. In particular, we follow Svens-
son (2010), who also shows how to solve a linear quadratic regulator (LQR)
problem with rational expectations.4
Let the linear dynamic model equations be
"
ˆ Xt+1
Hˆ xt+1|t
#
= A
"
ˆ Xt
ˆ xt
#
+ Bˆ it +
"
C
0
#
εt+1, (6)
where ˆ Xt is an (nX ×1)-vector of predetermined variables, ˆ xt is an (nx ×1)-
vector of non-predetermined variables, εt+1 is an (nε × 1)-vector of i.i.d.
shocks with mean zero, and ˆ xt+1|t is the expectation of ˆ xt+1 conditional on
information available at time t.
Minimizing the loss function (5) subject to the linear dynamic model
equations (6) under commitment with respect to ˆ Xt, ˆ xt, and ˆ it yields nX +
nx + 1 ﬁrst-order conditions. In order to implement a policy which is opti-
mal in a certain model with one parameter set into a diﬀerent potentially
misspeciﬁed model, the ﬁrst-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect
to the interest rate ˆ it is replaced by the policy resulting from the optimiza-
tion problem of the monetary authority. In contrast, implementing optimal
discretionary policy only involves replacing an ad hoc policy rule.
4Dennis (2007), Dennis (2004), or Söderlind (1999) suggest alternative solution methods
to the LQR problem which are equivalent to the method in Svensson (2010).
8Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.999
τ depreciation rate of capital 0.025
α capital output ratio 0.300
λw markup in wage setting 0.500
h habit portion of past consumption 0.573 ∗
ξw Calvo wage stickiness 0.737 ∗
ξp Calvo price stickiness 0.908 ∗
γw degree of partial indexation wages 0.763 ∗
γp degree of partial indexation prices 0.469 ∗
1/ϕ investment adj. cost 6.771 ∗
σc coeﬀ. of relative risk aversion 1.353 ∗
σl inverse elasticity of labor supply 2.400 ∗
φ 1+ share of ﬁxed cost in prod. 1.408 ∗
1/ψ elasticity of cap. util. cost 0.169 ∗
invy investment share of GDP 8.8τ
cy consumption share of GDP 1 − 0.18 − invy
¯ rk steady-state return on capital 1/β − 1 + τ
Table 1: Calibrated model parameters. Parameters marked with “∗” are
considered for misspeciﬁcation.
2.2 The model economy
In order to determine optimal monetary policy on the basis of the reference
model and to simulate data using the true model, we use a standard DSGE
model incorporating sticky wages and prices. The linearized model we employ
is closely related to the one developed by Smets and Wouters (2003). Hence,
we use a model that is on the one hand accepted in the profession, and on
the other hand captures the most relevant frictions necessary to ﬁt actual
data. Our calibration can be found in tables 1 and 2 and mostly follows the
results in Smets and Wouters (2003) for their estimated euro area model.
In what follows, we will just give a brief and non-technical overview of the
model features.5 We focus on the general structure of the model commenting
on the frictions implemented.
5For readers interested in details of the model and the linearized model equations, we
recommend to consult Smets and Wouters (2003).
9Parameter Description Value
ρǫa AR for productivity shock 0.823 ∗
ρǫb AR for preference shock 0.855 ∗
ρǫg AR for government expenditure shock 0.949 ∗
ρǫl AR for labor supply shock 0.889 ∗
ρǫinv AR for investment shock 0.927 ∗
σǫl S.D. of labor supply shock 3.520
σǫa S.D. of productivity shock 0.598
σǫb S.D. of preference shock 0.336
σg S.D. of government expenditures shock 0.325
σπ S.D. of inﬂation objective shock 0.017
σǫinv S.D. of investment shock 0.085
σλp S.D. of price markup shock 0.160
σλw S.D. of wage markup shock 0.289
σǫq S.D. of equity premium shock 0.604
Table 2: Calibrated shock processes. Parameters marked with “∗” are con-
sidered for misspeciﬁcation.
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households who maximize
their expected lifetime utility. Those households decide upon their intertem-
poral allocation of consumption and are subject to external habit formation
meaning that today’s utility depends not only on today’s consumption but
also on last period’s aggregate consumption. Technically, consumption habits
work as if one assumed consumption adjustment cost, thus they induce con-
sumers to adjust consumption levels more gradually. According to Abel
(1990), this eﬀect is sometimes referred to as “catching up with the Jone-
ses”, capturing the idea that households compare their consumption level to
the one of neighboring households’. Furthermore, they intratemporally face
a labor/leisure decision. A shock to the discount factor as well as a shock
to preferences are added to the households’ optimization problem. House-
holds face a budget constraint which allows them to shift funds intertem-
porally via riskless bonds and have labor income, income from investment
into state-contingent securities, and income from capital investments. Note
that a variable capital utilization rate is assumed which in turn aﬀects house-
holds’ return on capital and improves upon the persistence of the variables in
10sticky prices general equilibrium models (Dotsey and King, 2006). Therefore,
it might be preferable to ﬁrst increase the utilization rate before extending
the existing capital stock.
Wages are set in a staggered way following Erceg et al. (2000). With a
ﬁxed and exogenous probability 1 − ξw wages can be reoptimized whereas
with the converse probability, wages cannot be adjusted. As a result, wages
are set in a forward looking manner such that future expectations of wages
also become relevant for current wages. It is assumed that those wages which
cannot be reoptimized are subject to partial indexation which makes current
wages also depend on past wages.
On the one hand, households decide about their investment into the capi-
tal stock. This investment will be available for production with a one-period
lag. On the other hand, households inﬂuence the capital utilization rate
which determines how intensively the existing capital stock is used. This
is of particular importance as households face capital adjustment costs that
induce a wedge between the marginal product of capital and its rental rate,
introducing a variable price for capital.
The production sector consists of ﬁnal and intermediate goods producers.
Final goods producers construct consumption goods using intermediate goods
and sell them to households. Furthermore, they are subject to cost-push
shocks. The intermediate goods sector uses utilized capital and labor for
production. In order to motivate price setting on the side of the ﬁrms, they
act under monopolistic competition. Hence, ﬁrms have some degree of market
power. Prices are set according to Calvo (1983), in other words, ﬁrms are able
to reoptimize prices with a ﬁxed and exogenous probability 1 − ξp whereas
the non-optimized prices are partially indexed to last period’s inﬂation. This
induces price setting to be forward and backward looking at the same time
which results in a hybrid version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
As indicated before, we do not adopt the monetary policy rule used in
Smets and Wouters (2003) since it is our goal to implement a policy that is
also based on Taylor rule cross-checking.
113 Simulation
3.1 Simulation setup
As pointed out earlier, we assume that the monetary authority is faced with
uncertainty on the side of the parameters of the data generating process.
Consequently, the monetary authority is completely aware of the true struc-
ture of the economy but does not know all relevant parameters entirely.
At a ﬁrst stage, we consider cases where only single elements of the param-
eter vector are estimated with error by the monetary authority whereas all
remaining parameters are assumed to be known. We include those exercises
to isolate the eﬀects of misspeciﬁcation in single parameters. In particu-
lar, we focus on the Phillips curve parameters which refer to Calvo price
stickiness, ξp, and the degree of price indexation, γp. We do so because the
Philips curve is of particular importance for the conduct of monetary policy.
Note, however, that those illustrative cases shall not be regarded as adequate
depictions of reality. We will return to this point later.
At a second stage, we think of the misspeciﬁcation as being of a random
nature.6 In this case, parameter sets of the true model are randomly drawn.
The parameters that we consider for misspeciﬁcation are marked with “∗”
in tables 1 and 2. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, the stan-
dard deviations of the shocks that are incorporated in the reference model
do not inﬂuence optimal monetary policy. This is the so-called certainty
equivalence property (Svensson, 2010). Second, we exclude parameters that
were calibrated in Smets and Wouters (2003) or are directly pinned down
by those calibrations. Hence, we assume that those calibrated parameters
are known. A monetary authority is naturally confronted with uncertainty
about the economic environment that is not restricted to a subset of param-
eters only, let alone uncertainty about only a single parameter. Hence, it is
not suﬃcient to consider uncertainty about single elements of the parameter
6We also considered the case of a systematic over- or underestimation of the model
parameters. Even though it may or may not be realistic to assume that the monetary
authority estimates all parameters of a DSGE model to be higher or lower than what they
actually are, we analyzed those cases for completeness. Simulation results are not reported
for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
12vector in order to assess the usefulness of Taylor rule cross-checking and to
make normative statements for policy making institutions. In reality, a mon-
etary authority will not be able to estimate the parameters of the true model
without uncertainty. The parameter estimates will always be associated with
corresponding standard errors. In order to incorporate this in our analysis,
we assume that the parameters of the data generating process are the result
of random draws and therefore in general diﬀer from the reference model pa-
rameters. As such, we combine prior and posterior reasoning in order to ﬁx
a distribution for each parameter under consideration from which the corre-
sponding parameter of the data generating process is drawn. This allows us
to generate parameter draws that are in a reasonable range and ensures, for
instance, that none of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the shock processes
are equal to or exceed unity. More precisely, we adopt the distributional
assumption of the prior distribution for each parameter and subsequently ﬁx
the parameter pair (a,b) that uniquely identiﬁes the distribution in a way
such that the estimated posterior mode and standard deviation are perfectly
reproduced.
Whether an estimation bias is small or large is naturally related to the
standard deviation of the respective parameter estimate. Hence, we assume
that the estimation bias is in fact related to the estimated standard devi-
ation in Smets and Wouters (2003). Table 3 shows the parameters under
consideration together with the distributional assumption, posterior estima-
tion results, and the corresponding parameter pair (a,b) of the respective
probability distribution.
Optimal monetary policy is obtained using the reference model of the
monetary authority. The weighting parameter λy is initialliy ﬁxed to 2/3. In
reality, monetary authorities diﬀer in the relative emphasis placed on their
targets. While the ECB, for instance, is primarily concerned with price sta-
bility, the mandate of the Federal Reserve explicitly incorporates economic
activity. Hence, we consider diﬀerent values for the weighting parameter λy
in order to investigate heterogeneity also in this respect. We are interested in
the relative importance of the squared interest rate spread. Hence, we per-
form a series of simulations for diﬀerent values of λ∆ where the parameter is
13Parameter Distribution Mode S.D. a b
ρǫa Beta 0.823 0.065 29.094 7.042
ρǫb Beta 0.855 0.035 88.311 15.807
ρǫg Beta 0.949 0.029 65.572 4.470
ρǫl Beta 0.889 0.052 35.529 5.311
ρǫinv Beta 0.927 0.022 137.148 11.721
h Beta 0.573 0.076 23.603 17.844
ξw Beta 0.737 0.049 59.129 21.743
ξp Beta 0.908 0.011 632.285 64.963
γw Beta 0.763 0.188 3.527 1.785
γp Beta 0.469 0.103 10.610 11.880
1/ϕ Normal 6.771 1.026 6.771 1.026
σc Normal 1.353 0.282 1.353 0.282
σl Normal 2.400 0.589 2.400 0.589
φ Normal 1.408 0.166 1.408 0.166
1/ψ Normal 0.169 0.075 0.169 0.075
σǫl Inv. Gamma 3.520 1.027 16.891 62.975
σǫa Inv. Gamma 0.598 0.113 33.553 20.663
σǫb Inv. Gamma 0.336 0.096 17.417 6.188
σg Inv. Gamma 0.325 0.026 162.151 53.024
σπ Inv. Gamma 0.017 0.008 9.0412 0.1707
σǫinv Inv. Gamma 0.085 0.030 12.942 1.185
σλp Inv. Gamma 0.160 0.016 105.846 17.095
σλw Inv. Gamma 0.289 0.027 120.438 35.096
σǫq Inv. Gamma 0.604 0.063 97.756 59.648
Table 3: a and b refer to mean and standard deviation for the normal dis-
tribution, to the shape parameters for the Beta distribution, and to shape
and scale parameters for the Inverse Gamma distribution. Given the dis-
tributional assumptions, a and b are chosen in order to perfectly reproduce
the respective posterior mode and standard deviation. Properties for the
Inverse Gamma distribution are displayed for completeness and are used in
a robustness exercise.
14chosen to be in the range [0;0.25]. The reason for this choice is twofold. First,
Ilbas et al. (2012) ﬁnd that already small weights attached to the squared in-
terest rate spread are able to insure against bad outcomes. Second, we would
naturally expect λ∆ to be substantially smaller than the weights attached to
stabilizing inﬂation or output, respectively. For the model simulations, the
true model is used which is closed using the policy obtained from the opti-
mization problem of the monetary authority using the reference model. Since
squared deviations of the interest rate from the Taylor rule-implied interest
rate are irrelevant from a welfare-theoretical perspective, there is no reason
why one should evaluate the monetary authority’s loss using the per period
loss function given by equation (4) with λ∆  = 0. A reasonable alternative is
to compute the loss with respect to the traditional per period loss function
(1) even though the optimal policy is determined using (4). Therefore, it is
important to note that for model evaluation and loss determination λ∆ is set
equal to zero in all cases. This is in line with Ilbas et al. (2012) and ensures
comparability of the simulation results.
For each value of λ∆, we perform a set of N = 250 simulations7, each
using diﬀerent realizations of the shock processes and containing T = 5,000
simulated quarters. By doing so, we ensure that for each set of simulated time
series, simulated quarters that are more than T periods ahead are negligible
for loss evaluation.
3.2 Simulation results - commitment
Figures 2 to 6 show the simulation results where ﬁgures 2 and 3 refer to
the case where single model parameters are either over- or underestimated
compared to the reference model that is used to determine monetary policy.
Furthermore, we consider the case where the parameters of the true model
are randomly drawn in ﬁgures 4 to 6. Except for ﬁgures 5 and 6, we plot in
the upper panel the average relative loss between using the traditional loss
function (1) for the determination of monetary policy and using loss function
7Results remain robust if the number of simulations N is increased. We therefore ﬁxed
it for computational convenience as stated in the main text.
15(4) that is adjusted for a Taylor rule cross-checking term. When the respec-
tive values falls below 100%, adding the cross-checking term is on average
not beneﬁcial in terms of the monetary authority’s objective. Since we sim-
ulate the true model for each value of λ∆ N = 250 times, we end up with
a whole distribution of relative losses such that we are able to compute the
standard deviations of the relative losses. The respective plot can be found in
the lower left panel. Furthermore, conditional on assuming Gaussian relative
losses, we plot the probability that Taylor rule cross-checking is on average
not beneﬁcial for the monetary authority, in other words the probability that
the relative loss will be smaller than 100%.
The case where ξp is lower compared to the reference model by one pa-
rameter standard deviation is depicted in ﬁgure 2. Putting even a very small
weight on the Taylor rule cross-checking term worsens the situation of the
monetary authority in terms of the relative loss. The average relative loss
immediately falls below 100%, reﬂecting that the loss is smaller when stick-
ing to the non-adjusted policy. A weight of λ∆ = 0.1, for instance, results in
a loss which is on average about 6% larger compared to the loss incurred in
the baseline case. The standard deviation increases and approaches a value
of about 1.8% at λ∆ = 0.25. The lower right panel emphasizes that putting
a positive weight on λ∆ will almost always increase the loss. Hence, for this
parameter speciﬁcation, the monetary authority should not use the Taylor
rule when deciding about its monetary policy as this has on average adverse
eﬀects on the associated losses.
Next, we analyze the case where ξp is higher compared to the reference
model by one parameter standard deviation. The results in ﬁgure 3 are
qualitatively similar compared to the previous case, in other words adjusting
monetary policy for Taylor rule cross-checking deteriorates the monetary
authority’s loss. However, the eﬀect is stronger. The standard deviation
approaches a value slightly below 3%. The probability of ending up worse
compared to the baseline case is around 100% and can hardly be distinguished
from the certainty case.
It turns out that the results for Calvo wage stickiness, ξw, and the degrees
of price and wage indexation, γp and γw, are qualitatively similar and are
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Figure 2: ξp is lower compared to the reference model by one parameter
standard deviation (commitment case).
therefore skipped for brevity but available upon request. Also note that
results are qualitatively similar for diﬀerent values of λy. We return to the
importance of λy for the eﬃciency of Taylor rule cross-checking in detail later.
At this point, it is useful to emphasize that the above results are intuitive.
Cross-checking necessarily increases the loss for the monetary authority if its
reference model is almost identical to the true underlying economy as is the
case in those exercises. In what follows, we will show that once we allow
for a more realistic degree of uncertainty and diﬀerent degrees of monetary
policy commitment, results change such that cross-checking can be beneﬁcial
even though the reference model and the data generating process diﬀer in
parameter values only.
We now assume that misspeciﬁcation is of random nature. In this case,
nonlinear eﬀects may be important such that the overall eﬀect of Taylor rule
cross-checking on the relative losses cannot be deduced from cases where
only single elements of the parameter vector are misspeciﬁed. Whether or
not Taylor rule cross-checking is beneﬁcial for the monetary authority assum-
ing this kind of realistic misspeciﬁcation must therefore not only be based on
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Figure 3: ξp is higher compared to the reference model by one parameter
standard deviation (commitment case).
one single random parameter set. In order to make a normative statement
one has to take into account that there is in principle an inﬁnite number of
diﬀerent possible parameter combinations. Hence, we examine how Taylor
rule cross-checking inﬂuences the relative losses when considering a variety
of diﬀerent parameter draws reﬂecting potential data generating processes.
This will shed light on the average impact of Taylor rule cross-checking given
that the true model is in the neighborhood of the monetary authority’s ref-
erence model. We consider N = 250 diﬀerent random parameter sets and
simulate for each of those sets T = 5,000 quarters. Recall that for each of
the N = 250 simulated series diﬀerent realizations of the shock processes
are used. Since we do not a priori know whether a certain combination
of parameters leads to a determinate solution of the model, the parameter
combinations have to be checked for determinacy ﬁrst.8 We end up with a
8Reconsidering the statements about the usefulness of the Taylor rule quoted in the
introduction, it is likely that central banks indeed let the information resulting from simple
instrument rules inﬂuence their policy decisions. Hence, we conclude that determinacy
of the model even when including a Taylor rule cross-checking term in the monetary
authority’s loss function must be guaranteed. This justiﬁes only considering determinate
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Figure 4: True parameters are drawn from the respective distribution given
in table 3. For each of the N = 250 simulations, each containing T = 5,000
simulated quarters, a diﬀerent random parameter set is used (commitment
case).
total of 250 diﬀerent parameter sets reﬂecting potential data generating pro-
cesses at our disposal. The subsequent analysis is the same as before such
that the corresponding results can be found in ﬁgure 4. The eﬀectiveness
of Taylor rule cross-checking crucially depends on the weight λy as a mon-
etary authority on average beneﬁts more from cross-checking the less it is
concerned about economic activity. Comparing the three cases reveals that
ceteris paribus losses are lower the lower λy.9 However, it does not seem to
be advisable to perform the type of cross-checking presented in this paper
in the full commitment case. As we will show later, the degree of monetary
policy commitment will also be of importance.
By construction, welfare eﬀects shown before necessarily originate from
draws.
9The results remain qualitatively similar assuming a discount factor β of 0.995. Fur-
thermore, results remain robust if the standard deviations of the shock processes are also
considered for misspeciﬁcation even though they do not inﬂuence optimal monetary policy
(Svensson, 2010).
19Taylor rule cross-checking as only the uncertainty case is considered. This
raises the question how uncertainty aﬀects the eﬃciency of Taylor rule cross-
checking. In order to provide some intuition about the behavior of relative
losses in the certainty case relative to the uncertainty case, we present related
results in ﬁgure 5. In the certainty case, the monetary authority knows the
model parameters. Hence, the reference model that is used in order to deter-
mine monetary policy coincides with the model reﬂecting the data generating
process. The relative losses of the certainty case are depicted by dashed lines
in the upper panels. By construction, λ∆ > 0 deteriorates the monetary
authority’s objective since a loss-minimizing policy requires setting λ∆ = 0.
Put diﬀerently, the monetary authority cannot do better than following its
optimal commitment policy when it has complete knowledge about the econ-
omy. The solid lines refer to the relative losses in the uncertainty case. The
results on the left-hand side (λy = 1/10) and the right-hand side (λy = 2/3)
are identical to those depicted in ﬁgure 4. We consider those two cases just
for expositional purposes. In either of the cases, the relevant measure is the
vertical diﬀerence between the two lines which is depicted in the respective
lower panel. It is only of minor relevance in this context whether or not the
threshold of 100% is exceeded. The diﬀerence can in fact be interpreted as
the impact of uncertainty on the eﬃciency of Taylor rule cross-checking. In
other words, a positive value as obtained in the simulations indicates that
cross-checking becomes useful when moving from the certainty to the un-
certainty case. As a monetary authority always faces uncertainty, however,
only the uncertainty case remains relevant from a policy maker’s perspective.
Complete information about the data generating process necessarily renders
Taylor rule cross-checking obsolete.
As stated before, the results in ﬁgure 4 suggest that the monetary au-
thority’s type inﬂuences the eﬀectiveness of Taylor rule cross-checking sig-
niﬁcantly. In order to provide a more detailed picture of the impact of λy,
we perform the exercise above for a grid of diﬀerent values of λy reﬂecting
diﬀerent central bank types. Results are depicted in ﬁgure 6. We ﬁnd that
for a substantial number of parameter pairs (λy,λ∆) relative losses behave
qualitatively similar compared to the case before where λy has been ﬁxed
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Figure 5: Comparison of cross-checking under uncertainty (solid line) and
certainty (dashed line). The upper panels show the relative losses whereas
the vertical diﬀerence in percentage points is depicted in the corresponding
lower panel. The results on the left-hand side (λy = 1/10) and the right-
hand side (λy = 2/3) refer to the simulation exercises depicted in ﬁgure 4
(commitment case).
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Figure 6: Relative losses and contour plot for diﬀerent combinations of the
relative weights λy and λ∆. The lower right panel plots the choice of λ∆ as a
function of λy. True parameters are drawn from the respective distribution
given in table 3. For each of the N = 250 simulations, each containing
T = 5,000 simulated quarters, a diﬀerent random parameter set is used
(commitment case).
to 2/3. Relative losses start at 100% by construction when λ∆ = 0 and
decrease steadily with λ∆ in most of the cases. Even though Taylor rule
cross-checking turns out to be not beneﬁcial in the full commitment case it
is again worthwhile to emphasize that the monetary authority’s type seems
to inﬂuence its eﬀectiveness signiﬁcantly.
In general, diﬀerent parameter sets will impact diﬀerently on the mon-
etary authority’s objective. Losses may be lower for some parameter com-
binations while they may be substantially higher for others. In particular
the latter case is of importance if the monetary authority wants to insure
against worst-case scenarios, in other words parameter combinations that
produce overproportionally adverse outcomes. Hence, we shed light on the
relationship between the severity of parameter misspeciﬁcation reﬂected by
22the monetary authority’s absolute losses and the eﬀectiveness of Taylor rule
cross-checking represented by the relative losses. The setup is similar to be-
fore and we simulate N economies for a range of λ∆ and λy. Note, however,
that the same realizations of the random shock processes are now considered
for each of the simulations in order to make welfare eﬀects resulting from pa-
rameter misspeciﬁcation comparable. The absolute loss that the monetary
authority would incur in a hypothetical scenario without cross-checking, in
other words when λ∆ = 0 in the augmented loss function, is used as a measure
of the severity of parameter misspeciﬁcation. Put diﬀerently, parameter com-
binations that produce higher losses without cross-checking are interpreted
as worst-case scenarios. Given that it would be arbitrary to present simula-
tion results of a scenario using only one particular parameter draw, our aim
is to analyze the relationship between the eﬀectiveness of Taylor rule cross-
checking and such worst-case scenarios in general. We operationalize this by
calculating the coeﬃcients of correlation between the series of N absolute
non-cross-checking losses (λ∆ = 0) and the corresponding relative losses for
diﬀerent values of λ∆ and λy. The respective plot can be found in ﬁgure
7. The positive coeﬃcients of correlation indicate the following: Scenarios/-
parameter combinations that yield higher absolute losses for the monetary
authority assuming λ∆ = 0 tend to be associated with more eﬀective Taylor-
rule cross-checking (when λ∆ > 0) and vice versa. That is the sense in which
cross-checking indeed insures against worst-case scenarios. The ability to in-
sure against those bad outcomes tends to be stronger, the less the monetary
authority is concerned about stabilizing economic activity and the smaller
λ∆. In particular the former insight is supportive of our previous ﬁndings.
3.3 Simulation results - discretion
We drop the assumption that the monetary authority can credibly commit
to an announced policy and assume instead that no commitment technology
is available. As such, the monetary authority will not be able to perfectly
manage expectations. Whether or not commitment or discretion is a more
adequate depiction of reality is not obvious. Schaumburg and Tambalotti
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Figure 7: Coeﬃcients of correlation between the monetary authority’s abso-
lute losses (λ∆ = 0) and the corresponding relative losses (λ∆ > 0). For each
of the N simulations the same realizations of the random shock processes are
used (commitment case).
(2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2007), for instance, argue that an interme-
diate case may perhaps be more realistic.
The solution algorithms for the commitment and the discretion case dif-
fer signiﬁcantly. In contrast to the commitment case ﬁnding optimal discre-
tionary monetary policy is an iterative process and convergence properties
are highly sensitive to parametrization as pointed out by Söderlind (1999).
The simulation setup is identical to the one of the commitment case. Recall
that ﬁgures 2 and 3 depicted cases where single elements of the parameter
vectors were misspeciﬁed. Results do not change signiﬁcantly for the discre-
tionary policy maker and thus, we do not report comparable ﬁgures. The
results where the misspeciﬁcation is of a random nature can be found in
ﬁgures 8 and 9.
Again, in order to make a normative statement, a variety of diﬀerent
parameter draws for diﬀerent weights λy is considered in ﬁgure 8. Similar
to the commitment case, reducing λy improves the eﬃciency of Taylor rule
cross-checking. In contrast to before, however, for λy = 1/10 and over the
whole range of λ∆, cross-checking on average improves the relative losses. A
value of λ∆ = 0.25, for instance, produces a relative loss of about 112%.
In what follows, we again fully analyze the impact of λy on the monetary
authority’s objective. Results are depicted in ﬁgure 9. Again, we ﬁnd that
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Figure 8: True parameters are drawn from the respective distribution given
in table 3. For each of the N = 250 simulations, each containing T = 5,000
simulated quarters, a diﬀerent random parameter set is used (discretionary
case).
25results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in the commitment case
in the sense that low values of λy tend to increase the eﬃciency of Taylor
rule cross-checking ex ante. Most importantly, we ﬁnd that adjusting the
policy instrument in the direction of the Taylor rule has a stronger impact in
the discretionary case. When the monetary authority only moderately cares
about output relative to inﬂation stabilization, Taylor rule cross-checking
turns out to be on average beneﬁcial. This case is potentially relevant for
the Eurosystem as the mandate of the ECB emphasizes the inﬂation objec-
tive as the primary target of its monetary policy strategy. If the weight on
output stabilization is less than or equal to 20% of the weight on inﬂation
stabilization, the monetary authority is on average able to improve its loss
independent of the chosen value of λ∆. Summing up, our results suggest
that Taylor rule cross-checking can be beneﬁcial even in a setup where the
monetary authority is suﬃciently conﬁdent about its reference model at hand
and that the central bank type inﬂuences the eﬀectiveness of cross-checking
signiﬁcantly. We conclude that cross-checking is more eﬀective the less the
monetary authority cares about output stabilization and the lower the degree
of monetary policy commitment.
4 Conclusion
This paper builds upon Ilbas et al. (2012) and sheds light on the question
whether the robustifying nature of Taylor rule cross-checking in their spirit
carries over to the case of parameter uncertainty. We consider certainty with
respect to the structure of the economy but uncertainty of the monetary
authority about model parameters. In particular, we examine how much
attention the monetary authority should pay to choosing the relative weight
λ∆ for the conduct of its monetary policy and how results are sensitive to
changes in the monetary authority’s type and its degree of commitment.
Our results suggest that even though the monetary authority is faced with
uncertainty, it should be prudent in letting information resulting from Taylor
rule cross-checking of the kind presented in this paper inﬂuence the conduct
of its monetary policy. Put diﬀerently, while Taylor-rule cross-checking has
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Figure 9: Relative losses and contour plot for diﬀerent combinations of the
relative weights λy and λ∆. The lower right panel plots the choice of λ∆ as a
function of λy. True parameters are drawn from the respective distribution
given in table 3. For each of the N = 250 simulations, each containing
T = 5,000 simulated quarters, a diﬀerent random parameter set is used
(discretionary case).
27shown to be beneﬁcial in cases where the monetary authority is faced with
diﬀerent potentially non-nested models reﬂecting diverse representations of
the true economy, this result does not necessarily carry over to other forms
of uncertainty where the true model of the economy lies in the neighborhood
of the monetary authority’s reference model.
Whether or not cross-checking is on average able to reduce the mone-
tary authority’s loss incurred from inﬂation and output deviating from the
respective steady-state values crucially hinges on its type reﬂected by the
relative importance it attaches to output stabilization and also the degree of
monetary policy commitment. Much attention should be paid to choosing
the appropriate relative weight λ∆. This point is pivotal as we ﬁnd that for
high values of λy, for instance, putting already small weights on the Taylor
rule cross-checking term in an uncertain environment may have severe eﬀects
on the monetary policy objective.
As the monetary authority knows its own type and its degree of commit-
ment, it can choose λ∆ optimally. We ﬁnd that when the monetary authority
sets its policy in a discretionary way and at the same time only moderately
cares about output stabilization, Taylor rule cross-checking is on average able
to improve the associated losses. This insight deserves more attention in fu-
ture research and may potentially justify Taylor rule cross-checking for the
Eurosystem where output stabilization is generally considered a second order
objective.
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